Advanced2 hr 10 min8 implementation labs5 hostile paths

Build Consented address verification

An eight-lab, source-bounded workshop for the complete address verification lifecycle: exact commands and events, durable records, replay, concurrency, unknown outcomes, hostile fixtures, a maintained capstone, and production exit evidence.

Durable boundaryaddress verification · 9 states · 11 transitions · 9 event identities

Freeze the evidence boundary first

This curriculum teaches the durable host workflow around reviewed Mappls surfaces. It does not manufacture provider endpoints, callbacks, resource states, entitlement, or completion evidence.

The journey blueprint and application event contracts are implementation guidance, not Mappls provider payload specifications.Only linked normalized contracts and source guides may define provider request syntax; empty evidence is never backfilled.The simulator and maintained capstone operate in explicit fixture mode and make no entitlement claim.Credentials, precise production payloads, opaque native objects, and provider secrets stay outside workshop inputs and durable examples.
Lab 1 · 15 min

Model the lifecycle before the UI

Turn the address verification blueprint into an explicit aggregate boundary owned by the application.

Build

entered: One external business reference, opaque subject reference, declared purpose, and raw address intent are recorded.normalized: The declared address maps to a provider-backed Mappls Pin, coordinate, components, confidence, and provenance.capture_authorized: A specific subject granted one purpose-bound, expiring, accuracy- and retention-governed evidence capture.evidence_captured: Immutable source identity, event and receipt time, coordinate, accuracy, provider context, and integrity hash are committed.compared: A versioned policy records distance, effective uncertainty, thresholds, and its verify, reject, or review recommendation.review_required: Weak, conflicting, or policy-sensitive evidence is assigned to an attributable human decision.verified: A policy or human decision accepted the declared address for the exact recorded purpose.rejected: Evidence did not establish the declared address, with reason, recommendation, actor, and appeal path retained.cancelled: Consent was withdrawn before evidence capture and no precise observation may be accepted.

Prove before continuing

Every persisted state exists in the reviewed blueprint.Terminal states reject ordinary forward commands.Recovery text is operational guidance, not another hidden state.
Lab 2 · 20 min

Implement every command and event pair

Make intent, actor authority, allowed source state, committed state, and emitted fact reviewable together.

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enter_verification by Application user: new aggregate → entered; emit address_verification.entered.normalize_address by Policy service: entered → normalized; emit address_verification.normalized.authorize_capture by Application user: normalized → capture_authorized; emit address_verification.capture_authorized.revoke_consent by Application user: capture_authorized → cancelled; emit address_verification.consent_revoked.capture_evidence by Evidence capture application: capture_authorized → evidence_captured; emit address_verification.evidence_captured.compare by Policy service: evidence_captured → compared; emit address_verification.compared.verify by Policy service: compared → verified; emit address_verification.verified.reject by Policy service: compared → rejected; emit address_verification.rejected.defer by Policy service: compared → review_required; emit address_verification.review_required.review_verify by Human reviewer: review_required → verified; emit address_verification.verified.review_reject by Human reviewer: review_required → rejected; emit address_verification.rejected.

Prove before continuing

enter_verification resolves to consented-address-verification-address-verification-entered without claiming a provider webhook payload.normalize_address resolves to consented-address-verification-address-verification-normalized without claiming a provider webhook payload.authorize_capture resolves to consented-address-verification-address-verification-capture-authorized without claiming a provider webhook payload.revoke_consent resolves to consented-address-verification-address-verification-consent-revoked without claiming a provider webhook payload.capture_evidence resolves to consented-address-verification-address-verification-evidence-captured without claiming a provider webhook payload.compare resolves to consented-address-verification-address-verification-compared without claiming a provider webhook payload.verify resolves to consented-address-verification-address-verification-verified without claiming a provider webhook payload.reject resolves to consented-address-verification-address-verification-rejected without claiming a provider webhook payload.defer resolves to consented-address-verification-address-verification-review-required without claiming a provider webhook payload.review_verify resolves to consented-address-verification-address-verification-verified without claiming a provider webhook payload.review_reject resolves to consented-address-verification-address-verification-rejected without claiming a provider webhook payload.
Lab 3 · 15 min

Persist restart-safe records

Separate business identity, provider evidence, command receipts, immutable facts, audit, and downstream delivery.

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Verification aggregate: Business identity, purpose, lifecycle, selected evidence, comparison, decision, and version. Keys: verificationId, externalReference, subjectReference, purpose, state, version.Normalized address: Provider-backed place identity and address interpretation. Keys: mapplsPin, coordinate, formattedAddress, components, confidence, provenance.Consent grant: Attributable authority and privacy bounds for precise capture. Keys: consentId, subject, purpose, textVersion, grantedAt, expiresAt, retentionUntil, status.Evidence envelope: Immutable device observation with quality, timing, provenance, and integrity identity. Keys: evidenceId, sourceEventId, eventTime, receivedAt, coordinate, accuracy, contentHash.Decision record: Explainable recommendation, human disposition, override, and appeal context. Keys: policyVersion, thresholds, recommendation, outcome, actor, reason.

Prove before continuing

Process restart restores the same aggregate version and command result.Opaque SDK or native UI objects are not durable records.Provider evidence and application decisions remain distinguishable.
Lab 4 · 15 min

Make concurrency and replay deterministic

Apply optimistic expected versions and aggregate-scoped idempotency before executing effects.

Build

One external business reference maps to one verification aggregate.Precise evidence is accepted only under active consent for the exact declared purpose and time window.Provider normalization and application policy are identified separately.An automated actor cannot override its own policy recommendation.Every terminal outcome retains evidence hash, policy version, actor, and attributable reason.Precise evidence can be redacted without erasing the audit trail or claiming that retained hashes can reconstruct it.

Prove before continuing

An exact replay returns the first result without another event or version.A reused key with different intent conflicts.A stale expected version changes no durable truth.
Lab 5 · 15 min

Control effects and unknown outcomes

Commit outbox intent atomically, execute effects outside the transaction, and reconcile ambiguous results.

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Capture arrives after consent expiry or withdrawal: detect with Receipt or evidence event falls outside the committed grant window or grant status is revoked. Recover with Reject it without retaining precise payload and require a fresh consent for another attempt.Device evidence is replayed: detect with Source-event identity or content hash already belongs to an accepted evidence envelope. Recover with Return the original result for an idempotent retry or reject conflicting reuse as a security event.Address candidate is ambiguous or evidence accuracy is weak: detect with Provider confidence, device accuracy, separation, or policy combination enters the review band. Recover with Request clarification or independent review; do not transform uncertainty into a definitive match.Retention deadline passes: detect with Precise evidence remains present beyond purpose, tenant, or jurisdiction policy. Recover with Redact coordinate and place payloads, retain the minimum decision and integrity record, and audit completion.

Prove before continuing

A timeout remains an unknown outcome until identity-based reconciliation completes.Retries are bounded and preserve the original business and command identities.Dead-letter or manual review retains the entire attempt history.
Lab 6 · 15 min

Run all hostile fixture scenarios

Exercise the success path plus replay, concurrency, state, and response-loss failures without an account.

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Complete journey: Commit the shortest reviewed success path to the journey-specific operating target.Idempotent replay: Repeat one command identity and prove that version, event identity, and side effects do not duplicate.Stale version: Reject a command based on an outdated aggregate version without changing durable truth.Invalid transition: Reject a known command when the current state does not permit it.Unknown outcome recovery: Reconcile after a lost response, then replay the original command identity safely.

Prove before continuing

All fixture checks pass for all five scenarios.Rejected commands emit no event and do not increment version.The fixture makes zero provider calls and exposes no write tool.
Lab 7 · 20 min

Trace the Address Verifier capstone

Follow the maintained source through domain rules, adapter seam, repository transaction, HTTP boundary, UI evidence, and restart test.

Build

Run the app's declared test suite (8 tests).Run fixture mode without a credential.Inspect audit and outbox evidence after each transition.Restart the process and continue the same aggregate.

Prove before continuing

The downloadable archive checksum verifies before execution.The capstone covers the journey target without inventing provider completion.Browser and HTTP surfaces report the same durable version.
Lab 8 · 15 min

Qualify the real integration boundary

Replace only reviewed adapter seams and collect independent production evidence without weakening application invariants.

Build

Normalization confidence, ambiguity, latency, and provider failuresConsent grant, expiry, withdrawal, and out-of-window capture attemptsEvidence accuracy, age, source integrity, replay, and mock-location riskDistance and recommendation distribution by versioned policyReview queue age, outcome, override rate, and supporting-evidence classFalse-match, false-reject, correction, and appeal outcomesPrecise-data access, export, retention expiry, redaction, and legal holdIdempotency conflicts, version conflicts, outbox backlog, and restart recovery

Prove before continuing

Exact product entitlement and regional behavior are validated separately.Provider contract tests cover success, rejection, throttling, timeout, and unknown outcome.Security, privacy, operations, rollback, and product owners approve exact evidence.Fixture completion is never presented as provider or production completion.

Application-owned reliability scaffolds

The aggregate and SQL examples implement host truth; the fixture clients call the credential-free Journey Lab. Replace only the separately reviewed provider adapter seam.

Consented address verification workshop scaffolds
type State = "entered" | "normalized" | "capture_authorized" | "evidence_captured" | "compared" | "review_required" | "verified" | "rejected" | "cancelled";
type CommandName = "enter_verification" | "normalize_address" | "authorize_capture" | "revoke_consent" | "capture_evidence" | "compare" | "verify" | "reject" | "defer" | "review_verify" | "review_reject";

type Command = {
  name: CommandName;
  aggregateId: string;
  expectedVersion: number;
  idempotencyKey: string;
};

const transitions = {
  "enter_verification": { from: [null], to: "entered", event: "address_verification.entered" },
  "normalize_address": { from: ["entered"], to: "normalized", event: "address_verification.normalized" },
  "authorize_capture": { from: ["normalized"], to: "capture_authorized", event: "address_verification.capture_authorized" },
  "revoke_consent": { from: ["capture_authorized"], to: "cancelled", event: "address_verification.consent_revoked" },
  "capture_evidence": { from: ["capture_authorized"], to: "evidence_captured", event: "address_verification.evidence_captured" },
  "compare": { from: ["evidence_captured"], to: "compared", event: "address_verification.compared" },
  "verify": { from: ["compared"], to: "verified", event: "address_verification.verified" },
  "reject": { from: ["compared"], to: "rejected", event: "address_verification.rejected" },
  "defer": { from: ["compared"], to: "review_required", event: "address_verification.review_required" },
  "review_verify": { from: ["review_required"], to: "verified", event: "address_verification.verified" },
  "review_reject": { from: ["review_required"], to: "rejected", event: "address_verification.rejected" },
} as const;

export function decide(current: { state: State | null; version: number }, command: Command) {
  const rule = transitions[command.name];
  if (command.expectedVersion !== current.version) throw new Error("version_conflict");
  if (!rule.from.includes(current.state as never)) throw new Error("invalid_transition");
  return {
    state: rule.to as State,
    version: current.version + 1,
    event: rule.event,
    idempotencyKey: command.idempotencyKey,
  };
}

// Persist the result, immutable event, audit row, and outbox intent atomically.
// Store the first result by idempotencyKey before executing another effect.

Exit with reviewable evidence

All 11 reviewed transitions are implemented with actor and source-state checks.All 9 application event identities are immutable and versioned.Exact replay, idempotency conflict, stale version, invalid transition, and unknown outcome are tested.Aggregate, event, audit, command result, and outbox intent commit atomically.The Address Verifier capstone passes 8 declared tests after archive checksum verification.Provider entitlement, payload, callback, completion, and production behavior remain independently evidenced.
Workshop completion is not production authority

Workshop completion proves an application-owned reliability design only. Production still requires issued entitlement, exact adapter contract tests, regional and quota validation, security/privacy review, operational drills, and independent release approval.

Trace every external claim to an indexed source

Break the application before connecting the provider.

Run all five hostile scenarios and the maintained capstone test suite. Then qualify the exact provider seam under independently reviewed non-production entitlement.